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This paper examines the effect of Latin American central bank independence (CBI) on risk-averse 
behaviors in monetary policy. Using a fixed effects panel regression, I document how multiple 
forms of monetary policy are influenced by different macroeconomic variables, conflicting policy 
targets and central bank independence benchmarks. The results show that increasing CBI has a 
positive impact on risk aversion, especially in policies targeting inflation and money supply. 
Additionally, the results show that interest rates and reserve requirements were especially 
susceptible to changes in independence, while the monetary base and volume of domestic credit 
were less influenced. Finally, as time and inflation affect independence, they often also show a 
positive relationship with risk-averse policy implementation.   
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 Central bank independence is not something new to macroeconomists and policy makers. 
The theory of central bank independence (CBI) comes from a few different perspectives, but 
generally means that a central bank with close to zero ties to government policy allows the entity 
to operate solely by economic means, without political influence. This is especially valuable for 
maintaining inflation and price stability, as an independent central bank is not required to act as a 
direct lender to governments when they increase their deficits. Empirical evidence supports this, 
showing how CBI has a negative relationship with sustained inflation and price volatility. With 
this, central banks look to enhance their autonomy to demonstrate their commitment to price 
stability, a sign to market participants that their policy decisions can be trusted. There has been 
global sustained growth in CBI, with various studies concluding increases from 1980-2010 of 
around 40%. Latin American countries, however, have fallen behind developed economies in 
growth over the same time frame. Emerging markets seeking complete CBI benefit from higher 
degrees of respect in institutional structures, better human capital accumulation (outside of 
political pressure from governments pressing central banks to appoint economists they choose), 
and higher competitiveness amongst their peers. Although Latin American countries have 
followed the world’s largest economies in terms of CBI growth, and some benefits are 
undisputable, the question arises: how does CBI directly impact different forms of monetary 
policy? 
 Latin American economic growth has lagged in comparison to other economic 
powerhouses such as the United States and China. The 21st century has seen the closest 




convergence in Latin American growth to the United States, although this is still only 26%1. This 
is puzzling for economists, but is largely influenced by macroeconomic instability, with countries 
such as Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia having experienced periods of hyperinflation at different 
points over the past five decades. Furthermore, Latin America has been plagued with higher levels 
of inequality and political tension influencing macroeconomic policy, possibly having an impact 
of heightened levels of government spending and deficits. From 1970 to the early 2000s, large 
banking crises have occurred in the majority of the major economies, resulting in unique policy 
implementations. This includes dual exchange rates in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Brazil, among others; Argentina adopting a currency board that ended in a crisis in the late 1990s; 
and Ecuador implementing a full dollarization of their currency, which is still in place today2.  
 Amongst a persisting climate of economic instability in Latin America, the region has 
nonetheless undergone a positive move towards more CBI more recently. Reforms have focused 
on price stability and the formalizations of restrictions on central bank lending to the government 
Political independence could still be enhanced by restricting the government’s capacity to 
unilaterally appoint and remove central bank governors and directors, however. Latin America’s 
turbulent economic history and relationship with governments and foreign entities provides 
interesting grounds for analysis. Looking at monetary policy through the lens of CBI can provide 
insight as to how behavior is affected by independence, and if countries with higher levels of CBI 
have been able to outperform their peers. 
 While research has been previously published on CBI in the Latin American context, it has 
not covered its direct effect on monetary policy regimes, and instead focuses on the relationship 
 
1 Kehoe, Timothy J, et al. Macro Finance Research Program at the Becker Friedman Institute, 2019, A Framework 
for Studying the Monetary and Fiscal History of Latin America, 1960‐2017. 
2 Ibid. 




with macroeconomic variables. This gap in literature prompts me to recognize the relationship 
between the context of central bank independence and the actual implementation of different forms 
of monetary policy. I seek to understand the degree of the relationship and if CBI has impacted the 
way in which central banks react to the economic business cycle. Based on past literatures’ focus 
on inflation, I hypothesize that the main monetary policy regimes influenced by higher levels of 
CBI reflect more risk-averse decisions. Research has shown that higher global CBI has led to less 
price volatility and lower inflation expectations, so it is possible to see tighter monetary policy 
from central banks that have a higher degree of independence. 
 To answer these questions, I compile a panel dataset consisting of 14 Latin American 
countries, analyzing 12 variables across 1990-2012 on a monthly basis. The dataset includes four 
variables representing different forms of monetary policy: monetary base, volume of domestic 
credit, monetary-policy-related interest rate and reserve requirement ratio. 7 variables are included 
to act as controls to set up the macroeconomic and political landscape: economic growth, volume 
of international reserves held, market exchange rate, inflation, central bank chair turnover, 
exchange rate arrangements and CBI index. To analyze the data, I use a fixed-effects model, using 
four main regressions against each main monetary policy variable. 
 Using the fixed effects model, I find that the most statistically significant results come from 
interest rate and reserve requirement regulation; these two variables are those which represent the 
most isolated forms of monetary policy. Namely, CBI is positively correlated with interest rates 
and reserve requirements, demonstrating how central banks choose to raise rates as a means of 
limiting money in circulation, acting as leverage in the case that economic growth slows and 
inflation poses a threat. This conclusion aligns with the previous literature that generally states that 
more independent central banks are less likely to be swayed by political pressure to focus purely 




on economic growth variables and coerced into sourcing governments’ growing deficits. CBI 
allows monetary policy to focus on long-term targets and correlates with central banks making 
more risk-averse policy decisions.    




2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Literature on this topic is fairly robust, but can be divided in a two major categories: impact 
of CBI on certain macroeconomic variables, namely inflation, and research on individual 
countries’ independence in relation to monetary policy. 
Literature surrounding the influence of overall Latin American CBI on monetary policy 
heavily focuses on inflation. Burdekin and Laney (2016) used a 14-country sample from 1990-
2012 to analyze how and why central bank independence correlates with government spending 
and inflation. The ultimate conclusion was that greater CBI creates more checks on government 
spending, and in turn decreases inflation. This research relied on preexisting indices created by 
other economists, which will be discussed later. However, two of the most prominent indices used 
in studying Latin American CBI today also provide an analysis on its relationship to inflation; 
these being Gutiérrez (2004) and Jàcome and Vasquez (2005). Both papers, although using 
different methodologies for measuring CBI, both found negative correlations between CBI and 
inflation. 
This negative relationship that is concluded in the papers above is not surprising. To 
understand this, we can think about the alternative: a central bank that has prominent ties to the 
government. When the government decides to engage in spending or taxation, the tie to the central 
bank sets a precedent that the central bank is expected to react to whatever the government does, 
often to support their actions. A “dependent” central bank would be expected to fund a 
government’s rising deficit. This often takes the form of money printing, that in turn drives up 
prices and creates more inflation. The empirical evidence supports this. 




Literature on other verticals of monetary policy are less prominent, with one standout from 
Nunes and Da Silva (2008), analyzing how central bank independence and foreign exchange 
intervention intersect. Using data from thirteen Latin American countries, they concluded that 
greater CBI leads to less intervention in the foreign exchange market. CBI does not solely refer to 
the central bank’s relationship with the government, but also its ties to other countries’ 
monetary/fiscal policies. The concluding results of this paper confirm that as a country has a higher 
level of CBI, there are more likely to act independently against other countries’ actions, or where 
their currencies are headed.  
Existing literature that looks at CBI on a comprehensive basis for the entirety of Latin 
America points to a gap that should be explored: what is the relationship between CBI and all other 
forms of monetary policy, and does CBI influence how central banks go about choosing what kind 
of monetary policy to enact? The choice to normally focus on only one kind of monetary policy 
does not allow for a truly comprehensive understanding of these questions. 
Research that takes a closer look at individual countries generally still focuses on the 
relationship between inflation, but when it is focused on Colombia, the results are more 
comprehensive. Colombia is an especially interesting case study as it has gone through the most 
transformation in more recent decades. From 1962 to 1991, a government-dominated monetary 
board carried out many functions of the central bank3. This allows for a more contemporary view 
at monetary policy through the lens of a country that has seen both sides of CBI relatively recently. 
Important studies to come out of this are Meisel and Barón (2012) and their analysis on price 
stability at varying degrees of CBI in Colombia. Miles (2008) echoes the conclusions that as CBI 
 
3 Meisel and Barón (2010) 




levels increase, price stability increases; he also adds that price uncertainty decreases as CBI 
increases.  
There is a fair amount of literature that I will not mention that analyzes other Latin 
American countries’ CBI levels; however, the main takeaway from those readings is that there is 
something that can be added by looking at a group of countries together to compare the effects of 
CBI on price stability/uncertainty, among other variables. 
Broadening the scope of research beyond Latin America, there are a number of studies that 
analyze CBI and monetary policy more generally. Klomp and de Haan (2009) analyzed the 
relationship between CBI and financial instability from the period of 1998-2005, finding a robust 
negative relationship between the two variables. Alesina and Summers (1993) provides a 
theoretical explanation as to why central banks prefer independence, as risk averse citizens think 
this is the most optimal scenario. Using a dataset of twelve large, developed countries, Bade and 
Parkin (1988) concluded one of the initial findings that independent central banks can deliver a 
lower rate of inflation and price level volatility than other types of central banks. This research, 
however, is both outdated and focuses on fairly established, older economies; this allows for 
experimentation amongst Latin American countries along a larger time horizon. 
In deciding how to approach my research, I chose to forego creating my own index for 
central bank independence; instead I chose to use a few keys sources to derive this benchmark. 
There are four primary indices applicable to this analysis; each published after the other and build 
upon each others’ findings with more current data. Cukierman et al. (1992) uses 16 criteria of 
political and economic independence, where a higher rating from zero to one associates a higher 
degree of CBI. The index itself uses a weighted average of each criteria to denote a final CBI 
value. Jàcome and Vasquez (2005) go on to create a modified Cukierman Index, appending the 




criteria by adding a measure on central bank accountability and modifying some of the general 
structure of the Cukierman index4. Jàcome and Vasquez (2005) focus solely on Latin American 
countries and the Caribbean, much like the Gutiérrez (2004) index, which measured the de jure 
CBIs based on the constitutions in all Latin American countries. This index was based on five 
major criteria, such as central bank objectives and political and economic autonomy, and score 
them based on how the central bank’s decisions are protected under the constitution. 
The main drawback of these three indices is their date of publication; in order to develop a 
comprehensive analysis of central bank activity in the current environment, I will primarily look 
to Garriga (2016), who introduces an updated index of CBI, building upon previous findings. 
Garriga (2016) modernizes previous CBI indices through three primary means: central bank 
reforms are considered more drastically as variables that impact independence, increasing the 
sample selection to a robust data set of 182 countries and weighing CBI decreases just as much as 
the increases. This research similarly builds on Cukierman et al. (1992), as the criteria is easily 
replicable and has been widely used. The data set includes additional variables such as “central 
bank creation, a central bank reform that affects CBI in a given year, its direction (CBI increase or 
decrease), and whether the central bank is a regional entity5”. Given the robust nature of the 
analysis, and its references to previous research, this presents the best benchmark of CBI to use 
going forward with this analysis.  
  
 
4 Main modifications: redefining political autonomy, economic autonomy and the legal provisions for policy 
formulation 
5 Garriga, 2016 





In order to construct a robust dataset, I used a variety of macroeconomic variables, coupled 
with variables that act as a reflection of monetary policy. The data in question was entirely built 
from two sources. Initially, I used data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
database to build out my dataset, and then looked into individual countries’ central bank statistics 
hubs to fill missing values that the IFS could not supply. To build out a macroeconomic context in 
which my analysis could lie upon, I collected variables such as economic growth (either measured 
from real GDP or CPI numbers, dependent on what was more readily available at an appropriate 
frequency), volume of international reserves held by the central bank, currency exchange rates 
against the dollar, a dummy variable denoting when each country changed their central bank chair, 
and monthly inflation. The respective variable codes used in my statistical analysis are as follows: 
growth, intres_change, ex_change, chair, inf. In the case of all variables except for chair, they are 
represented as monthly growth rates. 
Variable growth intres_change ex_change chair infl 
Mean .1051796 9.142427 .0143154 .0263975 70.11407 
St. Dev. .4140856 213.9352 .137852 .1603351 539.2335 
Observations 3,214 3,782 3,850 3,864 3,648 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Variables 
Table (1) shows the descriptive statistics of each macroeconomic contextual variable over 
the time series for all 14 countries. Looking at these numbers, perhaps the most notable would be 
the high mean and standard deviation values for inflation. As mentioned in the context of Latin 
America within the Introduction section, the countries in my dataset have grappled with exorbitant 
inflation rates in recent years, with varying fluctuations, as demonstrated by the large standard 
deviation value. These fluctuating price levels set an important background for which this analysis 




can rest on. As explained by literature on CBI, CBI has been known to have a positive relationship 
with price stability. With this in mind, a focus on how inflation affects monetary policy along with 
CBI is explored throughout this paper, to see if price stability is a leading target in monetary policy 
implementation. 
Monetary policy objectives target inflation, exchange rates, growth and unemployment. In 
order to model these goals, the variables analyzed can be grouped into three categories of monetary 
policy targets: 
Exchange rate anchor 
 Exchange rates are influenced not only by central banks, but also the market. So, in order 
to isolate the effects of purely monetary-policy-related actions, I created a categorical variable to 
compliment the general USD exchange rate, denoting the type of exchange arrangement central 
banks have set up for each country. These categories were determined by the IMF’s Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). The categories are as 
follows: Exchange arrangement with no separate legal tender (1) means the “complete surrender 
of the monetary authorities’ control over domestic monetary policy.”6 Currency board 
arrangement (2) implies a monetary arrangement that is an explicit commitment to exchange 
domestic currency for a foreign currency at a fixed rate. Conventional pegged arrangement (3) 
pegs the domestic currency at a fixed rate to another currency or a basket of currencies, while a 
Stabilized arrangement (4) relates to having a spot market exchange rate within a small margin 
that is not floating. Crawling peg (5) means that the currency is adjusted in small increments at a 
fixed rate in response to the macroeconomic environment (mostly inflation); a Crawl-like 
 
6 AREAR, Revised Classification System, 2008 




arrangement (6) denotes that the exchange rate remains within a 2% margin relative to a specific 
trend, but it is still not floating. Pegged exchange rate within horizontal bands (7) means the 
country’s exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate between a set margin around the fixed rate. 
Floating (8) is an exchange rate that is largely determined by the market, while a Free floating 
(9) exchange rate is market-determined with intervention only under extreme circumstances. 
Other managed arrangement (10) is anything else that cannot be grouped in a previously stated 
category. This entire variable is coded as exrate_cat.  
Money anchor 
 As a way to monitor the central bank’s control over the money supply, I am using the 
volume of domestic credit as a proxy. The use of credit is a useful proxy as it is the most direct 
reflection of monetary action without the influence of external market fluctuations that is 
available to the general public. It also does not include international reserves, which is, again, not 
a direct impact from the central bank. In order to standardize this number in an attempt to combat 
autocorrelation, credit is measured in growth rates from the previous month. The code for this 
variable is credit_change.  
Inflation targeting 
 There are a few things the central bank can do to maintain inflation levels. The first that 
comes to mind is controlling the reserve requirement for commercial banks. The reserve 
requirement is a direct demonstration of a control over how much money is in circulation, as it 
limits the amount banks can lend out relative to the reserves they control. When the central bank 
raises the reserve requirement this is a direct parallel to if they want to minimize inflation. The 
data used for reserve requirements is found in a working paper by Pablo Federico, Carlos A. Vegh, 




and Guillermo Vuletin (2014). The authors created a database on monthly reserve requirement 
averages, which will be denoted as av_rr.  
 Inflation rate targeting is another commonly used form of monetary policy to control the 
amount of money in circulation and a way to control inflation. For this, I used monetary-policy-
related interest rates, which reflect the interest rate set by central banks as opposed to the market. 
As the value of the interest rate increases, this signals that central banks are engaging in 
contractionary monetary policy, attempting to control price levels as the cost of borrowing in the 
economy will increase. Thus, this is also a reflection of the money anchor objective, as interest 
rates have a direct effect on the money supply. This variable is represented by intrate. 
 Quantitative easing has become an increasingly popular alternative to traditional methods 
of monetary policy, where the central bank purchases longer-term securities to increase money 
supply. This tends to lower interest rates while also increasing money supply in order to encourage 
lending and investment. To represent quantitative easing, I am using the size of the monetary base, 
as this reflects the money the central bank uses to purchase assets with. Given that other variables 
of long-term securities are influenced by other factors other than monetary policy, the monetary 
base is the best reflection of something that is under the control of the central bank. This variable 
is symbolized as mbase_change, as it is analyzed as the monthly change in the base in order to 
standardize across time and countries.  
Using the variables discussed above, I compiled a data set of 14 countries, using a monthly 
time series from 1990-2012. Due to the availability of data for CBI numbers, I was forced to limit 
my analysis to 2012 rather than going until present day. The countries in question are Argentina, 
The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, 




Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay7. Due to the availability of certain datasets, there were 
some discrepancies of time, where some countries did not have complete data for all years, or some 
did not have any data for a certain variable. Similarly, in limited cases, data had to be interpolated 
from quarterly to monthly data. Growth rates were computed from each quarter and then 
transformed using: 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 = (1 + 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ)
1
3⁄ − 1.  
As described in the literature review section, measures of central bank independence were 
taken from Garriga (2016), the most contemporary, comprehensive index of CBI across 182 
countries. Building upon the Cukierman (1992) index, is uses over 840 sources to compute CBI. 
Final CBI values are represented on a scale of 0 to 1, where 1 is the highest level of CBI. CBI is 
conducted using measures such as central bank CEO tenure and relationship to government, central 
bank objectives, policy formulation and relationship to government budget. This totals to 16 
different measures which are each weighted to compute CBI. This variable is coded as cbi_i. 
Variable cbi_i mbase_change credit_change intrate av_rr exrate_cat 
Mean .6359979 .0218174 .0227534 13.22423 .1515849 6.507359 
St. Dev. .1891303 .092922 .1085856 44.0071 .103963 2.727745 
Observations 3,864 3,324 3,388 2,358 3,378 3,737 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of CBI and Monetary Policy Variables 
Table (2) gives the descriptive statistics for the monetary policy indicators and CBI index. 
This provides important context for the analysis in question later in my paper. For example, 
exrate_cat shows that most central banks are inclined to engage in close-to-floating arrangements, 
meaning that they are content with keeping rates that are influenced by fluctuations in the exchange 
rate market; however, they are still inclined to hold some authority over the rates, by fixing them 
within a certain boundary. Another important variable to look at is cbi_i, that reveals that the 
 
7 Panama was initially included in the dataset but was ultimately excluded due to lack of data available for analysis 




average CBI across countries and time tends towards higher rates of dependence. A standard 
deviation of around .189 exhibits a decent fluctuation in these values, given the differences in 
countries’ rates.   





To analyze my compiled panel data set with descriptive variables of monetary policy regimes and 
the macroeconomic landscape, I run a fixed effects model on the four main monetary aggregates 
to see how each group of independent variables influence the outcomes. The regression equation 
used is: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝛼𝑖 represent the country fixed effects and 𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽 represent the covariates, 𝑖 represents the country 
and 𝑡 represents the time linear trend.  
For each regression equation, the four dependent variables used are: the change in monetary base, 
the change in volume of domestic credit, the monetary-policy-related interest rate, and the average 
reserve requirement ratio. For each regression, monetary policy variables are used in tandem with 
the control variables described above in the data section. For instance, when regressing interest 
rates against the given independent variables, lags of mbase_change, credit_change and av_rr are 
used to understand how monetary policy practices coexist amongst one another. Lags are used to 
eliminate potential redundancy and simultaneity bias within the data. The other covariates used in 
each regression are controls for economic growth, international reserves, exchange rates, a dummy 
variable for chair turnover, inflation, and CBI. 
 Additional interaction variables are created to understand how one variable in the dataset 
might be a factor that impacts its own effect on y. An example of this in my dataset is time’s effect 
on CBI. CBI across countries has the tendency to be increasing over time as more central banks 
are pressured into becoming more independent. Alesina and Summers (1993) echoes this idea by 
concluding that central banks tend towards independence due to risk aversion among the 




population, preferring CBI, as it has a positive relationship with price stability. Figure (1) shows 
this increasing time trend for both all economies present in Garriga (2016), along with a separate 
time trend for the Latin American economies analyzed in this paper. 
 
Figure 1. Average CBI has been increasing on average, demonstrating how central banks are tending 
towards more independence from governments 
 
I create an interaction variable between CBI and a linear time trend to account for this 
phenomenon, to further analyze how monetary policy practices have changed over time as CBI 
changes. It is just as important to understand how different levels of CBI affect monetary policy, 
as well as understanding how changes in CBI over time influence how central banks have changed 
the way in which they conduct monetary policy. Using this same line of reasoning, I create an 
interaction term to represent the relationship between CBI and inflation. Gutiérrez (2004) and 
Jàcome and Vasquez (2005) highlight this idea, explaining how CBI and inflation have a negative 
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into it as well, and may point to the changes in the implementation of price control targets in policy 
making. An immediate analysis of this before any tests have been run is that this interaction 
variable extrapolates the effects of CBI as inflation increases; with a higher level of CBI and higher 
rates of inflation, central banks are likely to act more drastically than if they have a lower CBI. 
 Once these variables have been generated, the variables are analyzed through a fixed 
effects model, allowing for variables across countries to be analyzed over time. The choice of a 
fixed effects model over a random effects model is due to the assumption used in the random 
effects model that the α, in this case representing country fixed effects, must be uncorrelated with 
ε. This is a something that can not be asserted in my model, so fixed effects is more appropriate as 
it does not assume this. More generally, the fixed effects model allows me to group the variables 
within each country, but still regress them over time.   




5 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Each of my four regressions provide different levels of analysis. Modeling out monetary 
base and credit volume provide interesting insights, and allow me to reach a similar conclusion. 
Tables (3) and (4) show the results of the fixed effects panel data regression model estimated by 
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(.0063261) 
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 constant -.0909031 
(.3475822) 
N 1,205  N 1,197 
Groups 10  Groups 10 
Tables 3 and 4. ∗ , ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are featured below estimate values in parentheses. 




From the regression output in Table (3) showing the impact of different variables onto 
mbase_change, the immediate reaction is the from response to the interaction between CBI and 
time versus CBI alone. While cbi_i is not statistically significant, cbitime is statistically significant 
at the 95% confidence interval. This demonstrates that, holding all else fixed, a one unit change in 
the level of CBI interacted with time is associated with a .0002468 predicted decrease in the 
monetary base for a given country. While the relationship is not drastic, it does state that as time 
passes and the trend in CBI becomes more of a concern to central banks, as do more expansionary 
monetary policy measures involving the monetary base. This seems counterintuitive to some 
degree; more of the research done on CBI’s interaction with monetary output shows that central 
banks tend towards more risk-averse forms of policy. With zero or minimal ties to political 
pressure, the concerns of the central bank should focus entirely on the health of the economy. This, 
however, should not entirely imply that central banks will only engage in contractionary policy 
with complete independence. So, the degree of the positive relationship between monetary base 
and CBI being quite small implies that higher CBI has a correlation with a growing monetary base, 
a form of expansionary monetary policy. However, the robustness of this conclusion has to be 
analyzed before any formal conclusions can be made. For this, I look to my three other main 
regression outputs.  
 Looking to the regression output on credit_change in Table (4), the significance of the 
relationships with the volume of domestic credit provides less room for analysis. Namely, only 
one variable has a significance worth considering: the impact from the change in exchange rates. 
Holding all else fixed, this shows a positive significant relationship between exchange rates and 
the level of domestic credit. In other words, as the exchange rate depreciates, the central bank is 
going to take more preventative measures to strengthen the domestic currency. In this case, an 




approach they seemingly would take is to increase the level of borrowable credit that is either 
directly going towards the government or large commercial banks. This may also seem 
counterintuitive: an exchange rate depreciating implies that the domestic country is going through 
a period of higher inflation (relative to the USD, in this case); the central bank should be looking 
for measures to counteract inflation, meaning contractionary monetary policy should be at the 
forefront of their concerns. Giving the government access to more funding can point to a direct 
threat to inflation, as this adds more money into circulation. Looking back at Table (3), however, 
might give some interesting insight. There is also a significant relationship between the monetary 
base and exchange rate, but it is the exact opposite. This fits better into the hypothesis that the 
central bank engages in contractionary policy when the exchange rate depreciates. The monetary 
base could be seen as a more direct form of contractionary policy; it demonstrates the amount of 
money the central bank is controlling in the economy. The volume of credit can be manipulated 
for reasons beyond the scope of the money supply. These ideas, however, point to an even more 
critical idea.  
 In the case of both the monetary base and the volume of credit, it is not possible to make 
complete conclusions on direct forms of monetary policy as there are certain variables in the data 
points that are not controlled by the central bank alone. For example, domestic credit is reflective 
of the amount that is offered for both the government and the largest domestic commercial banks. 
For this reason, while part of this variable can be impacted by government influence, it is not 
government influence alone that can impact changes in this. If the central bank increases credit, 
this could simply be at the respect of commercial banks needing funding, which is not something 
that impacts CBI. This is important to note moving forward to the next two regression outputs. 
Different from the two analyses above, the monetary-policy-dictated interest rate and the reserve 




requirement are influenced by the central bank and only the central bank. With this in mind, the 


















   5 3.34845*** 
(.7702275) 
   6 1.313502** 
(.6455815) 
   7 17.05684*** 
(.9254298) 
   8 -4.290185*** 
(.6681301) 
   9 1.190324* 
(.6681301) 
















Table 5. ∗ , ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are featured below estimate values in parentheses. 




Table (5) provides the regression output on monetary-policy-related interest rates. The 
influence of CBI in all three instances is statistically significant; this allows us to conclude that 
CBI does have a direct impact on interest rates. However, each instance tells a different story. CBI 
and the individual interest rate variable demonstrate results that align with my initial hypothesis. 
As CBI increases, there is a positive impact on interest rates. This implies that countries with high 
levels of CBI are more risk averse. The interest rate is an important tool for monetary policy in 
order to limit the amount of spending and investment in the economy. At the most fundamental 
level, increasing interest rates encourages individuals and corporations to save more as they will 
gain more on what they hold. This tool is used then to control the amount of money flowing 
through the economy. This is an especially critical instrument when controlling inflation. As 
inflation rises, central banks tend to raise interest rates to decrease the demand for goods and 
services, with the intention to lessen money growth. Rising interest rates point to more risk-averse 
behavior as central banks put price stability at the forefront of their targets.  
The interaction between inflation and CBI echoes this idea: the regression output for this 
variable demonstrates that as inflation goes up, this amplifies the effects of CBI on interest rate 
policy. More risk aversion is put into play by highly independent central banks as inflation 
increases, which supplements the idea that interest rates tend to increase when inflation increases, 
but also reaffirms the idea that risk-averse central banks are more likely to react more strongly to 
inflation. Finally, the interaction between CBI and time has an unpredicted negative effect on 
interest rates, as the model suggests. This result states that as the linear time trend grows with CBI, 
namely as time impacts CBI, interest rates decline. The significance of this conclusion is not as 
valuable as the other two interest rate variables, however.  




Focusing instead on the impact of inflation on interest rates, another important monetary 
policy target must also be discussed: the impact on inflation on exchange rates, and how interest 
rates inadvertently impact them. As explained above in the Data section above, interest rates at the 
monetary-policy level are denoted by a categorical variable dependent on the arrangement dictated 
by the central bank. These categories increase by level of float. As the model demonstrates, due to 
lack of variation in the data for the first 4 categories, they were automatically dropped. 
Nonetheless, the regression output for the 6 most variable arrangements demonstrate that exchange 
rates impact interest rates alike to inflation. As each of these arrangements integrate a level of float 
within them, this means the market for exchange rates and price levels within the country affect 
the exchange rate, rather than using a fixed peg for instance. A country with a floating exchange 
rate is more susceptible to changes in price levels; as inflation in the domestic currency increases 
at a faster rate than the USD, the currency depreciates in value. With this in mind, central banks 
have an added risk of inflation onto exchange rates, so risk-averse interest rate policy is more likely 
to occur. Aside from categories 8 and 9, each category’s impact on exchange rates is positive and 
statistically significant.  To further emphasize this idea, the direct relationship between the market-
established exchange rate and interest rates is also positive and increasing at a statistically 
significant level. It is also important to note the trade-off between inflation and exchange rate 
targeting in this context. Monetary policy targets often conflict with one another. As the exchange 
rate has pressure to depreciate, central banks attempt to contract money supply or raise interest 
rates to reverse it. This, however, can often have a deflationary effect on prices in the attempt to 
support exchange rates. So, the relationship between interest and exchange rates is not completely 
black and white, and should be analyzed as such.  




The results of this regression tie the most directly to the literature published on CBI, namely 
that CBI has a direct impact on combatting inflation and creating an emphasis on price controls. 
This was the subject of studies conducted by Gutiérrez (2004), Jàcome and Vasquez (2005), and 
Burdekin and Laney (2016). Generally, these studies and the regression output above reaffirm the 




































   5 .0087744 
(.0092693) 
   6 -.0731454*** 
(.0073709) 
   7 -.0072626 
(.0126151) 
   8 .0057379 
(.00794) 
   9 -.0710319*** 
(.0076842)*** 
















Table 6. ∗ , ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are featured below estimate values in parentheses. 
 




Finally, Table (6) presents the regression output on the average reserve requirement over 
the same time horizon in context. Here, three critical things stand out. Namely, the effect of CBI 
is prominent for both it alone and it interacting with time. In both cases, a positive relationship is 
seen between the two variables in question, at a statistically significant level. For CBI alone, this 
shows that as CBI increases by one unit, there is a predicted increase of 1.9666 in the reserve 
requirement. Similarly, with the interaction variable with time, as the increasing trend in CBI 
changes over time by one unit, there is a smaller predicted increase of .0005457 in the reserve 
requirement.  
 These values demonstrate a clear relationship between independence and a marker of risk 
aversion amongst monetary policy decision-making. As a central bank becomes more independent, 
their decisions are no longer as dependent on political pressure. Political pressure is more likely to 
coerce the central bank into engaging in forms of expansionary policy. Expansionary policy is 
normally a means of making the economy appear more fruitful and dynamic, decreasing 
unemployment, encouraging spending and investment, and scaling up supposed productivity. 
However, there is an obvious caveat to this: inflation and money supply growth can deteriorate the 
economy at the same time. Without the political sway of the government, the central bank 
seemingly becomes more risk-averse; price stability is at the forefront of decision-making. Upping 
the reserve requirement shows that the central bank prefers to be risk averse at the expense of 
political implications. A higher reserve ratio forces commercial banks to be less flexible with their 
reserves, meaning more must be kept on their balance sheet for safe keeping. This decreases the 
chance of bailouts, bank runs, and general distrust in bank security. So, while this has the adverse 
effect of lower money in circulation in the economy, an economic goal of governments who want 




consumers to be satisfied with economic growth, it also pleases consumers by giving them the 
satisfaction of knowing their funds are safe in the bank.  
 An interesting caveat of this would be the case of Mexico, who has allowed an average 
reserve requirement of zero to persist across the entire time series. Implemented in the 1990s, the 
reasoning for this lies upon the idea of opportunity cost. Rather than using the reserve requirement 
as a way to mitigate bank risk, a zero-reserve requirement works to encourage banks to not hold 
extra reserves to enhance the circulation of funds in the economy. Due to the reserve requirement 
level remaining stagnant throughout the series, it was omitted from the model as no relationship 
could be concluded from it. However, the use of a zero rate is an interesting case study on its own. 
Namely, while risk-aversion is at the forefront of central banks’ agendas, Mexico’s policy has yet 
to receive a negative consequence for its supposed risky behavior.  
 Chair turnover interestingly has an impact on the reserve requirement, something that 
cannot be seen in the other three analyses above. There is a positive, significant relationship 
between chair turnover and the reserve ratio. Immediately, this points to the idea that more chair 
turnover leads to more risk aversion among central banks; however, what is the value of knowing 
this? Central bank turnover in this case could be a proxy for central bank independence. A possible 
explanation for this would be that more central bank chair turnover allows for a refreshment in 
monetary objectives. A chair that has held the position for 10+ years might have fairly outdated 
goals, and therefore they may not be reflective of the risk-averse policies that more central banks 
are leaning towards. Similarly, the position of the central bank chair is often appointed by the 
government; if the government is happy with their chairs’ positioning on policy, they might choose 
to keep them in rather than take on someone new whose ideals misalign with the political tactics. 




 That being said, the counterargument to that is too much central bank turnover is a negative, 
as it points to instability within the group. Cukierman, Webb, Neyapti (1992) asserts this idea. In 
constructing the proclaimed CBI index, chair turnover was one of the factors used. While no 
specific models where tested to confirm this, Cukierman et al. suggested that frequent chair 
turnover was either a sign of volatility within the central bank or a sign that chairs were turning 
over in tandem with changes in the political agenda. That being said, the economists also explained 
that low chair turnover could be a sign of stagnation within the central bank, echoing my 
hypothesis stated above. Ultimately, the conclusions in this study were not based on empirical 
analysis as much as the opinions of the economists, whereas, CBI was taken into account in my 
modeling, eliminating external bias, which allows me to make more concrete conclusions about 
the impact of chair turnover on risk-aversion. 
  





 Global trends in monetary policy have pointed towards positive changes in CBI. As CBI 
increases, this allows more autonomy over monetary policy decisions, while also creating a higher 
degree of consumer confidence amongst populations. This, in its most basic form, means that when 
monetary policy is implemented, citizens are more likely to trust the motions of the central bank 
and act accordingly to how the central bank hopes they react. In the context of Latin America, a 
region that has often been plagued by turbulent political and economic pressures, the value of CBI 
is indispensable. A more independent central bank allows for policy to be implemented solely for 
economic reasons, especially investing in long-term growth and stability within the confines of the 
country. 
 These ideas created the foundation for which my thesis could grow. The question then 
presents itself: how does CBI affect the ways that monetary policy is exercised? By analyzing this 
question, one can begin to analyze what lies behind monetary policy, ultimately understanding 
how risk-aversion is affected with a growing level of CBI. I hypothesize that CBI and risk-aversion 
are positively correlated, under the basis that as political pressures on central banks become more 
limited, monetary policy becomes more forward thinking, as central banks do not have to succumb 
to political influences to maintain a growing economy when the economy is not healthy enough to 
do so. A central bank with lower independence is more likely to be a direct lender to the 
government, aiding in their increasing deficits. This means that short-term goals to facilitate 
government intervention would be at the forefront of monetary policy plans, which in turn can lead 
to increased inflation and price instability. To address my research question, I compile a panel data 
set consisting of 14 countries over 1990-2012, looking at the following variables: monetary base, 
volume of domestic credit, monetary-policy-related interest rate, reserve requirement ratio, 




economic growth, volume of international reserves held, market exchange rate, inflation, central 
bank chair turnover, exchange rate arrangements and CBI index.  
 I perform a fixed-effects regression analysis on four monetary policy variables (monetary 
base, volume of domestic credit, monetary-policy-related interest rates, and reserve requirements) 
to learn about what drives different types of monetary policy, focusing on CBI. The results 
demonstrate that interest rates and reserve requirements, the most isolated forms of monetary 
policy in my dataset, have the most significant correlation with CBI. In both cases, as CBI rises, 
central banks have an incentive to implement more risk-averse mechanisms, thus driving both 
interest rates and reserve requirements up.  
 To further expand upon this analysis, interaction variables for CBI are created for time and 
inflation. These interaction variables generally confirm the analysis presented above, but 
demonstrate how inflation and time extrapolate the effects of CBI on monetary policy. In the case 
of the interaction between CBI and time, the results show that CBI’s effect on monetary policy 
grows over the linear time trend. This shows that CBI is growing in popularity, and that central 
banks need to act more independently as it becomes the norm to do so. In the case of inflation, this 
interaction variable enhances the idea that central banks become more risk averse with growing 
CBI when inflation is also growing. This too aligns with my previously-stated hypothesis; central 
banks become more risk-averse with growing independence, but also are more responsive when 
price levels are increasing. Inflation is a marker for economic instability, so more CBI means that 
central banks will engage in stronger contractionary policies with increasing prices. 
 Looking for critically at my analysis, there are obvious limitations in the work, especially 
looking at the data being analyzed. An immediate drawback is the availability of the data being 
used. For starters, having to limit my analysis to just over 20 years is the result of a gap in CBI 




literature. The most contemporary index is Garriga (2016), so I felt it was most appropriate to use; 
however, the study only went to 2012. I had to accept the limitation as is. Conducting my own 
analysis of CBI would have required more work and expertise that lies outside of the scope of this 
thesis. Another limitation would be the gaps of data within the established time frame. The 
difficulty of gathering all data points at an appropriate frequency was the largest hurdle of this 
project, as central banks are not always willing to disclose certain variables. This forced me to get 
creative and, again, accept that there would be cracks within my analysis. Finally, another 
limitation was the modeling of monetary policy. Gathering data on variables that perfectly reflect 
policy implementations is a challenge; this is the reason that my regressions for monetary base and 
volume of credit were not conclusive as they were not completely transparent forms of monetary 
policy. For exchange rates, upon collecting all of my data, I realize that there is no way to regress 
exchange rate policies, as there is no frequent data on rates that were not driven by the market. I 
instead use categorical exchange rate arrangements in my regressions to look at how they impact 
policy variables that are analyzable.  
 With these limitations in mind and my analysis as a whole, there is room for interesting 
further research. CBI indices are comprised of different weighted variables to determine scores for 
different countries at different years. An analysis could be created looking instead at the individual 
components of CBI regressed on similar variables for monetary policy to understand what are the 
most critical influences of independence on policy reform. Another area of further research would 
be to similarly understand how monetary policy and fiscal policy interact within the context of 
CBI. As central banks become more risk averse and detached from government intervention, is 
this a constraint for fiscal policy? Given that low independence is often related to central banks 




being direct lenders to government’s deficits, it could be possible that expansionary fiscal policy 
is weaker in the face of higher CBI as governments have less to work with.  
There is so much more to unpack when it comes to CBI, especially looking at developing 
economies that are often put off in analysis due to lack of concrete data and resources. I believe 
that research in CBI will continue to grow, and incentives for central banks to put this goal at the 
forefront of their interests will prosper. Through the lens of Latin’s America’s persisting political 
and economic instability over decades, or even centuries, the importance of risk-aversion is clear: 
more safe practices can be a solution to start combatting these issues head on. This would not only 
impact the economies’ positions on a global scale but also be a potential resolution for an extensive 
list of deeper ingrained economic and social issues. CBI is in many ways the foundation for 
healthy, objective policy making, and is an indicator of economic health. Considering the results 
of this paper, CBI has power to influence risk-averse behaviors within central banks, and as more 
long-term goals sit among their top priorities, it is safe to assume that economies will thrive 
because of it. 
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